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WHEN VICTIMS SEEK CLOSURE:
FORGIVENESS, VENGEANCE AND
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Susan Bandes*
As one who has always opposed the death penalty, I find that my
principles are most sorely tested when I hear of the anguish of the
parents of children who have been murdered. As a mother, I won-
der how a parent goes on to live her life each day after such an
unimaginable loss.
In 1996, I read several articles about the upcoming execution of
William Bonin, also known as the Freeway Killer, in Southern Cali-
fornia. Bonin had confessed to killing twenty-one boys and young
men, and was sentenced to death for fourteen of those murders.'
The victims were mostly hitchhikers Bonin had picked up, raped,
brutalized and strangled.2 He had exhibited no remorse, and in-
deed had seemed to delight in torturing the parents when they re-
quested information from him about their sons' deaths.
Sandra Miller, the mother of a fifteen year old boy who Bonin
had raped, tortured and strangled sixteen years earlier, was one of
several parents of victims who said she expected a sense of closure
from Bonin's death. "At the moment before the injection," she
said, she would be seeing her dead son, Rusty, in her mind, and
thinking, "Rusty, it's almost over. He's finally going to pay." 4 A
victims' advocate who had worked with several members of the
families said that "in the aftermath of the emotional devastation
the murders wrought, some of the relatives had virtually put their
lives on hold as the appeals process dragged out. 'Now,' she said,
they hope the execution will 'open the door to being able to go on
with the rest of their lives." 5
Sandra Miller wrote a letter to Bonin which she hoped he would
read just before his execution, which read, in part:
You taught me a few things: How to hate, that I feel I could kill
you, little by little, one piece at a time. You'd best get down on
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your hands and knees and pray to God for forgiveness. I don't
know if even He could forgive you. But I hope the Lord can
forgive me for how I feel about you.6
The victims' rights advocate said that none of the family members
she had spoken to had forgiven Mr. Bonin, and she did not advise
them to try. She said "I tell them there are some things we aren't
able to forgive and we should let God do that."'7
A little more than a year ago, Aaron McKinney was spared the
death penalty for the torture and brutal murder of Matthew Shep-
ard, a gay college student McKinney and his friend Russell Hen-
derson had abducted, beaten, burned, tied to a fence and left for
dead.8 Prosecutors said they had wanted to seek the death pen-
alty,9 but apparently the agreement to a sentence of life without
parole came about largely at the insistence of Matthew Shepard's
parents.10
Here is an excerpt from what Dennis Shepard, Matthew's father,
said at McKinney's sentencing hearing:
I would like nothing better than to see you die, Mr. McKinney.
However, this is the time to begin the healing process, to show
mercy to someone who refused to show any mercy, to use this as
the first step in my own closure about losing Matt ..... Mr.
McKinney, I'm going to grant you life, as hard as it is for me to
do so, because of Matthew .... You robbed me of something
very precious and I will never forgive you for that. Mr. McKin-
ney, I give you life in the memory of one who no longer lives.
May you have a long life and may you thank Matthew every day
for it."
He also said that he and his wife had supported the plea agree-
ment because it meant no drawn-out appeals process, no chance of
walking free on a technicality or receiving a lighter sentence and no
opportunity for McKinney to become a symbol. He said "[n]o
years of publicity, no chance of commutation . . . just a miserable
future and a more miserable end. It works for me . . "12
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Michael Janofsky, Wyoming Man Get Life Term in Gay's Death, N.Y.
TiMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at Al.
9. See id. at A23.
10. See id. (citing David M. Smith, a spokesman for the Human Rights Campaign,
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It is agonizing to read such statements. Despite the very differ-
ent reactions of these parents, it is obvious that they are all living in
a kind of hell, and are all seeking the elusive state they call " clo-
sure" to help them go on with their lives. Not that they seek to
forget, or to stop grieving, but that they are frozen in a nightmar-
ish, unbearable moment and must find a way to get beyond it, to
achieve some respite from the images that haunt them. Their quo-
tations are about forgiveness and vengeance - both Miller and
Shepard talk about these, though they see the concepts very differ-
ently. Miller seeks closure in execution. She describes a sense that
only capital punishment will come close to righting the moral equi-
librium. 13 She evokes her experience of the long wait for execution
as another kind of torture, another barrier to closure.14 She sees
forgiveness (both of Bonin and of the hatred in her own heart) as
something that will have to come from God.
Shepard is not opposed to execution on principle, but in the case
of his son's torturer and killer, he finds that there may be a more
satisfying punishment in allowing him to live, knowing his life is a
gift from his victim's family. He finds healing will come more
quickly if he forgoes the long appeals process in favor of a quick
and certain final outcome. He, too, has no intention of forgiving,
but his feelings about mercy and vengeance are more complicated.
What are we to make of these very different reactions? We may
feel that one is more sympathetic, 15 more in line with our spiritual
or political beliefs, or more likely to lead to psychological healing;
and we might know how we would hope to react if a child of ours is
brutally murdered. More likely, though, it is something we try
hard not to think about at all, and surely most of us cannot know
how we would react. Therefore, it seems to me we ought to be
very slow to judge what any particular individual in that position
ought to feel or want.
But there is a separate question: the question of the law's proper
role in helping victims or survivors achieve the closure they need.
This is where we do need to judge, and to decide. And where it
becomes important to at least try to untangle what one's religion
13. The parents of some of John Wayne Gacy's victims described a similar convic-
tion. See Larry Oakes, For Parents of Son Murdered By Gacy, The Years of Waiting
Are Finally Over, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRin., May 11, 1994, at Al.
14. See id.
15. Jacoby and Murphy both note that people tend to feel more sympathetic to-
ward the forgiving victim than toward the angry, resentful victim. See SUSAN JACOBY,
WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 358 (1983); See also JEFFRIE G. MUR-
PHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 16 (1988).
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might urge, from what psychiatry might try to achieve, from what
politics might dictate, and all of those from what the law can,
should or even attempt to accomplish.
When we talk about emotion's role in law, a number of difficul-
ties inevitably arise - many of them a function of the attempt to
employ complex and fluid psychological or philosophical concepts
for narrow and pragmatic legal ends. There is, for example, the
difficulty of finding a fixed definition for any particular emotion, or
emotional state-forgiveness, the desire for vengeance, closure....
There is the difficulty of attempting categorical judgments about
whether a particular emotion ought to be encouraged or discour-
aged in the law, or even in a particular legal context. There is,
finally, the difficulty of assigning a role to the legal system in
achieving particular emotional states - for example in helping vic-
tims attain closure or defendants feel remorse. 16 Yet the alterna-
tive to asking these daunting questions is not simply to ignore the
emotional content of legal proceedings - the emotions, as the
Shepard and Miller statements remind us, won't go away no matter
what. So it is crucial, given the high stakes for victims, survivors,
the accused, and society at large, that we examine and try to disen-
tangle the questions.
We might begin by examining the question: what do victims re-
quire in order to achieve some measure of closure? 17 Assertions
about what victims need are often presented as if they are empiri-
cally based. If this is indeed an empirical question about what con-
ditions are most likely to help, we ought to be looking for empirical
answers, and there are surprisingly few out there.18 The quotations
from Ms. Miller and Shepard indicate, anecdotally, that this is a
question with variable and complex answers, as one might expect.
The little empirical evidence of which I am aware supports the in-
tuitively obvious view that different victims have different needs,
16. See THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1-15 (Susan Bandes ed., 2000).
17. This question, of course, must be distinguished from other questions that often
come up in discussions of forgiveness, vengeance and punishment in general: such as
the question of what will help the wrongdoer, the question of what will deter future
potential wrongdoers, and the question of what will help bring a larger form of clo-
sure, or equilibrium, to society at large.
18. Alternatively, it might be a prescriptive question - an inquiry into the condi-
tions we, as a society, believe are appropriate responses to victimization. I think this
is a more accurate description of the traditional inquiry into victims' needs. However,
the more recent trend has been to couch the inquiry in terms of what victims in fact
require. See Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim Im-
pact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545, 551-52.
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and that an individual victim's needs. may change over time.19
Moreover, these studies deal with the victims themselves, for ex-
ample in crimes like rape or robbery, and their findings, inconclu-
sive at best, are also not necessarily applicable:. to the needs of
those who have lost a close relative to murder.2 °
Even if it were so that victims or survivors need certain emo-
tional experiences in order to attain closure, what conclusions
would this lead to? This is the point at which it. becomes crucial
not to fall into the trap of conflating two very separate questions:
the question of what victims need and the question of what the
legal system ought to provide.
For example, what if, as Jean Hampton and others have sug-
gested, victims need to be able to forgive in order to attain clo-
sure?21 There are a host of questions raised here. First, of what
does forgiveness consist? Most of those who write in this field, in-
cluding Jeffrie Murphy, Martha Minow, Susan Jacoby and Willard
Gaylin, describe forgiveness as an internal change in the heart of
the individual victim that doesn't necessarily bring any external or
public consequences.22 Thus the victim's forgiveness may have no
bearing on society's demand for punishment. Indeed, the victim
herself might plausibly forgive and still desire punishment - as
Jean Hampton suggests. The victim might choose to forgive, both
to cleanse her own heart of hatred and because she is willing to
believe the sinner is more than just the sum of his sins - yet also
might desire retribution for the sins themselves. 3 Hampton tells
the remarkable story of the practice in colonial New England of
urging the criminal to repent, holding a reconciliation feast once
he'd done so, and then hanging him the following day.24
19. See, e.g., Edna Erez, Victim Participation in Sentencing: And the Debate Goes
On..., 3 INT'L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 17, 21 (1994); Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell, supra
note 18, at 545; Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 937, 964-66 (1985).
20. Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell, supra note 18, at 550-51 (discussing problems
with drawing conclusions about murder survivors from studies about victims of other
crimes).
21. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 36-38.
22. See WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND: A QUESTION OF
JUSTICE 338 (1982); MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 21; JACOBY, supra note
15, at 334; MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 15 (1998). Jean Hampton, how-
ever, describes forgiveness as having an external component, in that it is "bestowed"
upon the wrongdoer. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 36.
23. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 157.
24. See id. at 158.
2000] 1603
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
Second, who has the right to bestow forgiveness? This question
is a pervasive theme in Gaylin's book, The Killing of Bonnie Gar-
land, in which he describes how many members of the clergy and
community were willing to forgive Richard Herrin for his brutal
murder of Bonnie Garland, and indeed, perhaps as a consequence
he was ready to forgive himself - even before he had repented or
accepted responsibility in any meaningful way." Bonnie Garland's
parents did not forgive him, and of course, Bonnie could not do so.
Yet, as Gaylin describes it, the support and forgiveness of the reli-
gious community had a significant mitigating effect on Herrin's ver-
dict and sentence.26 Perhaps a parent can forgive her child's
murderer for the pain the parent suffers, but can anyone other than
the victim herself, or perhaps one's God, offer forgiveness for the
entirety of the loss? 27 And what effect should the forgiveness of
these others have in the courtroom?
Let's turn from forgiveness to vengeance. What if, as Jacoby and
others suggest, and as the parents of the children killed by the Cali-
fornia Freeway Killer so strongly believed, vengeance is necessary
for a victim's or survivor's closure? This, too, raises a host of ques-
tions. What form ought that vengeance take? Is it based, in whole
or in part, on what the individual survivor needs, or believes she
needs at the time, or on some collectivized notion that takes these
needs into account but doesn't acquiesce to them? And how ought
we factor in the problem that certain punishments, such as the
death penalty, bring with them an agonizingly long wait for survi-
vors, one which they often describe as yet more torture? Should
this wait be seen as another part of the wrong that needs to be
avenged?
One difference between forgiveness and vengeance is immedi-
ately apparent. As I mentioned, forgiveness is often described as
merely internal, a change of heart that doesn't dictate any course
of conduct, and therefore doesn't implicate public justice at all.
Frankly, I don't think this view can be wholly accurate - I believe
25. The notion of repentance as a condition of forgiveness raises another issue -
that while forgiveness might be an internal emotional change, it might depend on an
emotional change, and its external manifestation, in the wrongdoer. See, e.g.,
GAYLIN, supra note 22, at 118; MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 41.
26. See GAYLIN, supra note 22, at ch. 4.
27. This is also a central question of Sue Miller's recent novel, While I Was Gone,
in which the murderer of the protagonist's close friend both asks her forgiveness for
the murder and makes clear that he has been generous in his willingness to forgive
himself, evidently without fully repenting or even accepting responsibility for the act.
See SUSAN MILLER, WHILE I WAS GONE (1999).
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that notions of forgiveness, mercy and compassion are inextricably
part of the process of setting norms for what is criminalized and
how it is punished.28 Nevertheless, vengeance presents a far less
ambiguous case - it clearly is not an internal process. To the ex-
tent a survivor requires a measure of vengeance for closure, either
the legal system is implicated, or we are talking about vigilante jus-
tice, which the legal system was set up to supplant.29
Assumptions about survivors' need for retribution or vengeance
are often explicitly invoked in legal decision making. The failure to
sentence a particular defendant to death or to a long prison term is
often experienced as a devaluing of the worth of the victim's life,
and thus another infliction of pain upon the victim's family, 3° and
indeed prosecutors explicitly call upon juries to return death
sentences in order to affirm the victims' worth.31 One implicit as-
sumption of introducing victim impact statements in capital cases
seems to be that they will make the jury more likely to give a death
sentence to help ease the survivors' evident pain.32
In addition, the lengthy appeals process is seen as an affront, an
additional punishment, to survivors needing closure. Governor Jeb
Bush of Florida, for example, in his current campaign to truncate
the death penalty appeals process in that state, has "emphasized
the suffering of victims' families and complained that inmates
spend about fourteen years on death row before they are exe-
cuted. '33 To what extent, then, should the needs of these families
influence policymaking?
I raise this long list of daunting questions, not because I have
answers to them, but in the hope that we can discuss them further.
First, let us be careful to distinguish the question of what victims
need from the question of what the legal system ought to provide.
Some of what individual victims or survivors need to attain closure
must come from psychological, religious and social support sys-
tems. Such systems have greater ability to individuate among vic-
28. See THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 16, at 1-15; Susan Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366-71 (1996).
29. See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EvOLuTION OF OUR
LEGAL SYSTEM 92-99 (1980); Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, supra note 28, at 407 n.230.
30. See JACOBY, supra note 15, at 237; GAYLIN, supra note 22, at 347.
31. See, e.g., State v. Elliott, 475 S.E. 2d 202, 222 (N.C. 1996); Welsh S. White,
Prosecutors' Closing Arguments at the Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 297, 306-08 (1990-91).
32. See generally Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell, supra note 18 (discussing
Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479).
33. Jim Yardley, A Role Model for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, at 5.
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tims and to accommodate the shifting and complex needs of
particular victims. They are not obligated to reach a fixed and cat-
egorical judgment, or any legal judgment at all. Moreover, they
are not obligated to weigh a host of other factors against the vic-
tim's needs, including the rights of the defendant and the good of
society as a whole.
Second, let us be very careful when we talk about what victims
need, and perhaps especially about their perceived need for clo-
sure. The legal system does demand certain kinds of closure, but
they may not track the sorts of therapeutic or spiritual closure vic-
tims seek. Sometimes the legal system may be able to provide a
punishment, or a result, that meets the individual's needs for ven-
geance, forgiveness, closure. Such people are fortunate (at least in
that limited respect) because the burden of individual forgiveness
or vengeance is heavy indeed, and a public, collectivized resolution
at least may remove some of this weight from the victim's shoul-
ders. But the legal system cannot and ought not meet such needs
on a case by case basis.
Legal closure is, at some point, necessary - at some point the
law needs to act definitively.34 But given the terrible stakes in-
volved, an essential part of its closure is that it incorporate notions
of fairness and due process. Given the law's many limitations, it
also ought to incorporate a large measure of humility. It needs
humility about the possibility of error3 5 and also about the impos-
sibility of knowing the secret heart of either the wrongdoer or the
victim.
Closure is too easily transformed, particularly in capital cases,
into an ending that forecloses, too early, the societal obligation not
to put an accused to death until he has a fair chance to show him-
self unworthy of the conviction and sentence. My own view is that
a capital sentence is a sort of closure we are ill equipped to com-
mand, since it reflects our unwarranted claim that we can judge
who is irredeemable, without humanity or value. Just as we might
show more humility before claiming to know what victims need, we
might show more humility in declaring ourselves worthy to judge
not just the sin but the sinner, and to decide who is deserving of
that terrible and irrevocable form of closure.
34. See Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, supra note 28, at 389-90.
35. See Steve Miller & Ken Armstrong, Another Death Row Inmate Cleared, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 19, 2000, at 1 (reporting that Illinois has cleared more death row inmates
[13] than it has executed [12] since it reinstated capital punishment in 1977).
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